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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

WHO OWNS MY DONATED TISSUE? THE PUBLIC’S PROSTATE
INFLAMMATION: A CASENOTE ON WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY v.
CATALONA

I. INTRODUCTION
“It’s been in there for a year, and it’s ghastly.” 1 Larry Johnson, former
executive of Alcor Life Extension Foundation, was referring to the cryonically
frozen head of former Major League Baseball player, Ted Williams. At death,
Williams purportedly had his head and body frozen separately in the hopes that
future technological advancements could resurrect him. 2 However, serious
doubts exist as to whether Williams ever intended to be placed in such a
facility. 3 Further, one can be sure he never meant for someone to refer to his
frozen, decapitated head as “ghastly.” 4 Is there a remedy at this point? Does
the Williams family have control over his body? Should Williams even be
classified as dead? 5 Instead, presume Williams donated his head for research
(premised on grounds he might want it back someday), does it then follow that
once the donation is made, he loses all ownership rights to that donation?
Ted Williams’ head is an abstract (albeit grotesque) analogy to Washington
University v. Catalona, a case currently pending in United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 6 The issue in Catalona is whether donors of
prostate tissue samples for research purposes have any rights to those tissues
once the physical donation has been made. 7 Catalona’s importance cannot be
understated. According to one observer, “[T]he Catalona case raises a series

1. Richard Sandomir, Ted Williams Tale Gets Stranger by the Day, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14,
2003, at D2 (quoting Larry Johnson, former Chief Operating Officer of Alcor Life Extension
Foundation).
2. Id.
3. Tom Verducci, What Really Happened to Ted Williams: A Year after the Jarring News
that the Splendid Splinter was being Frozen in a Cryonics Lab, New Details, Including a
Decapitation, Suggest that One of America’s Greatest Heroes May Never Rest in Peace, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 18, 2003, at 66.
4. Sandomir, supra note 1.
5. See Alcor Life Extension Found., Inc. v. Mitchell, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 572, 575-576 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992) (The court did not rule out the possibility of revival of cryonically frozen bodies, but
stated that “those persons who will then head our various branches of government will be far
wiser than we and entirely capable of resolving such dilemmatic issues without our assistance.”).
6. Washington Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
7. Id. at 987.
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of questions whose answers will shape the evolving law of research on body
tissue.” 8 More importantly, this case’s outcome will affect more than just a
handful of people. According to a 1999 report by the RAND Corporation, over
307 million tissue samples from more than 178 million people were stored in
the United States, increasing by a rate of 20 million samples each year. 9 The
samples are collected from routine medical tests, operations, clinical trials, and
research donations, such as the one presently in question. 10 Thus, Catalona
has the potential to be a “landmark” case in the field of property rights and
biological materials. 11
In order to investigate Catalona’s potential impact, the case will have to be
examined. First, the case’s basic facts will be laid out. Second, various
property arguments will be examined including whether exclusive possession
and control of a biological sample determines ownership and whether the
donations were inter vivos gifts or bailments. Clarifying the property rights
issues will be helpful but not determinative. Finally, the fact that tissue
donations are biological materials further complicates matters because federal
regulations will be implicated, at least to some extent, if the research involves
human subjects. But does research involving stored tissue constitute research
involving human subjects? Would severing any identifying informational ties
linking the sample to the donor (a process called anonymization) eliminate the
involvement of human subjects? If not, donors must give informed consent
prior to participating in the research. However, it is often unclear as to what
exactly they are consenting. Ambiguity also exists as to what should happen
when participants decide to withdraw from the research. What happens to a
donor’s unused samples? An examination of all of the above questions will
hopefully clarify the case of Washington University v. Catalona.

8. Lori Andrews, Who Owns Your Body? A Patient’s Perspective on Washington
University v. Catalona, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 398, 399-400 (2006). In fact, Andrews’ article
included a bit of the history of a patient owning his own tissue outside of his body. Id. at 400.
She stated that the common law did not allow people to have property rights to their body. Id.
Interestingly, she stated, “[T]he common law basis for preventing people from voluntarily
transferring their body parts . . . may not have its roots in the view that the body is sacred and that
people should not be objectified as property. Rather, it may arise from the notion that people’s
bodies were the property of the Crown.” Id. If they maimed their body, they could not fight for
the king. Id. That ended by 1804, apparently, as her research uncovered a story from England in
1804 where a creditor arrested a dead body for a debt. Id.
9. Rebecca Skloot, Taking the Least of You, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2006, at § 6. Doing the
math, there should be 467 million tissue samples in the U.S. by 2007. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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II. BACKGROUND OF WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY V. CATALONA—WHAT
HAPPENED?
A.

Facts of the Case

Washington University (WU) is a private research university with a
medical school which includes the Division of Urologic Surgery. 12 William
Catalona (Catalona), an urologist, surgeon, and researcher, worked in the
Urology Division at WU from 1976 to 2003, 13 and he was Chief of the
Division from 1984 to 1998. 14 Catalona’s research focused on prostate cancer,
and through thousands of surgeries at WU, he collected many research samples
from the excised, cancerous tissues of patients. 15 Some of those patients
became research participants (RPs) and subsequently plaintiffs in the case at
bar. The patients’ samples were stored in the Genito-Urinary Biorepository
(Biorepository), which Catalona was “instrumental” in establishing. 16
The Biorepository is operated by WU and is used strictly for research
purposes. 17 WU employees administer it, and WU provides the majority of
funding to operate and maintain it. 18 The Biorepository holds “biological
specimens of prostate tissue, blood, and DNA samples . . .” collected not only
from Catalona’s surgeries but also from other WU physicians and outside
researchers, as well. 19 Of the 30,000 research participants in prostate cancer
studies, only about 3,000 were patients of Catalona, and those patients only
donated a total of 3,500 prostate tissue samples. 20
WU has instituted a process to distribute samples from the Biorepository to
outside researchers. In 2002, WU created a Peer Review Panel which handled
all sample requests from the Biorepository, including those from researchers
outside WU. 21 Prior to leaving WU, Catalona submitted three sample requests
that were approved, but he did not subsequently request any other samples via
the Peer Review Panel. 22

12. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 988.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. It is interesting to note that the research participants (RPs) in this case were patients
of Catalona, and they referred to themselves collectively as “patients,” not “research
participants,” in all of their briefs. However, since the district court referred to them as RPs
throughout its opinion, that is how they will be referred to here.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 989.
18. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 989.
19. Id. at 988-89.
20. Id. at 988-89.
21. Id. at 993.
22. Id. at 993-94.
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Further research institutions have procured research samples from the
Biorepository, subject to Material Transfer Agreements (MTA). 23 The MTAs
were required for studies which occurred either outside of or in partnership
with WU. 24 Seven MTAs, signed by Catalona himself, acknowledged WU as
the owner of the samples. 25 In one instance, Catalona attempted to change the
MTA to assert co-ownership of the samples with WU, but when WU refused to
alter it, Catalona signed it nonetheless. 26
WU had an Intellectual Property Policy, which stated:
[A]ll intellectual property (including. . .tangible research property) shall be
owned by [WU] if significant [WU] resources were used or if it is created
pursuant to a research project funded through corporate, federal, or other
external sponsors administered by [WU] . . . .[G]enerally, creators and research
investigators will retain custody of tangible research property while at [WU]. 27

As defined, “tangible research property” includes biological materials, owned
by WU per the agreement. 28 Both the Intellectual Property Policy and the
MTAs were used as evidence to show that WU had held the property rights to
the samples, not the RPs or Catalona. 29
RPs in WU studies had to sign “informed consent” forms, which bore the
WU logo. 30 The forms stated that the RPs could not claim ownership rights to
any product resulting from the research. 31 The forms further stated that the
biological donations were “a free and generous gift of [blood, tissue, and/or
DNA] to research that may benefit others.” 32 The forms also provided for
withdrawal from research, stating “you may choose not to participate in this
research study or withdraw your consent at any time.” 33 The forms were silent
on the issue of whether RPs could withdraw their previously-donated samples
or transfer them to another facility. 34 However, testimony at trial showed that
once RPs chose to withdraw from participation, WU had three options
concerning the previously-donated tissue: destroy the samples, store them
indefinitely, or “anonymize” them. 35

23. Id. at 989.
24. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 989.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 995.
27. Id. at 989 (quoting Plaintiff’s Exhibit 17, § I.3(a)).
28. Id. at 995.
29. Id.
30. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 990.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 992. In anonymizing a sample, all information linking the donor to the sample is
destroyed. Id. at 992, n.10.
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In addition to the informed consent forms, RPs were also given
(purportedly to sign) a “WU Genetic Research Brochure,” which stated that if
an RP decided to withdraw, “you should call the investigator listed on the
consent form, [y]our tissue will be identified and destroyed upon request,” and
“any research results already obtained cannot be destroyed or recalled.” 36 Like
the informed consent form, the brochure was silent as to whether RPs could
withdraw their previously-donated samples or transfer them to another
facility. 37
In early 2003, Catalona left WU to continue his prostate cancer research at
Northwestern University. 38 Prior to doing so, he sent letters to 60,000 RPs,
even those that were not his patients, informing them of his intent to leave
WU. 39 Catalona asked the RPs to sign an attached “Medical Consent &
Authorization” form, which purportedly allowed all samples to be released to
Catalona. 40 Six thousand RPs returned a signed form.
B.

Procedural History

WU filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri to settle the ownership dispute over the
Catalona was the original defendant, and the RPs later
samples. 41
intervened. 42 Concerning the issue of ownership, the district court held a
preliminary injunction hearing that included all parties, including the RPs, in
April 2005. 43 A decision on the injunction was issued on March 31, 2006 44
and is currently on appeal in the Eighth Circuit. 45 Oral arguments concerning
the appeal were heard on December 13, 2006, 46 and an opinion is expected in
the summer of 2007.
III. DISTRICT COURT’S CONCLUSIONS
The district court stated that the sole issue in the case was ownership, and
asked whether “[T]he research participants retain ownership rights in such
materials in that they can direct said materials’ use and transfer to third-

36. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 990.
37. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 990.
38. Id. at 993.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 987.
42. Id. at 989 n.5.
43. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 988.
44. Id. at 985.
45. The case numbers are No.06-2286 and No.06-2301.
46. Oral arguments are available for listening online at the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit’s website, http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/tmp/062286.html (last visited Jan.
21, 2007).
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parties.” 47 The court concluded that WU owned the tissues because it had
exclusive possession and control over them, and the RPs had not produced
sufficient evidence to overcome that. 48 With WU having ownership, the RPs
retained no right to transfer. 49 Further, the court found that the WU obtained
the samples via inter vivos gifts, not as bailments as the RPs had suggested. 50
However, the issues in this case were clouded because there were special
considerations concerning biological materials, such as informed consent
forms and a RP’s right to discontinue participation in research.
IV. PROPERTY ARGUMENTS: DOES EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION AND CONTROL
DETERMINE OWNERSHIP? DID WU ACQUIRE SUCH POSSESSION VIA INTER
VIVOS GIFTS OR BAILMENTS?
The sole issue in Catalona is whether WU or the RPs own the tissue
samples, and to what extent. The fact that the samples in question are
biological materials will cloud the analysis of ownership and control, but a
proper analysis begins by first examining the issue as if the samples were
general personal property. Next, the issue of how property is transferred via an
inter vivos gift will be examined. The last property-based argument to be
discussed is an alternative legal explanation that the samples instead were
bailments, with WU as bailee.
A.

Property Ownership, Generally

Property ownership is relatively straightforward. In Missouri, where the
events in Catalona occurred, a prima facie case of ownership is established by
meeting both requirements of a two-part test: (1) exclusive possession and (2)
control of the personal property. 51 The non-possessor bears the burden of
establishing ownership by a preponderance of the evidence. 52 For example, in
Foltz v. Pipes, two brothers argued over the ownership of a coin. 53 Since the
defendant brother had exclusive possession and control of the coin, the court
held he had prima facie evidence of ownership. 54 The plaintiff could not meet
his burden of establishing ownership by a preponderance of the evidence. 55
In Catalona, the court framed the issue as whether the RPs retained
ownership rights of their samples to such an extent that they could transfer

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 994.
Id. at 997.
Id.
Id. at 997, 1001.
Id. at 994 (citing Foltz v. Pipes, 800 S.W.2d 14, 15 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)).
Id.
Foltz, 800 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
Id. at 15.
Id.
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them to third parties. 56 The court noted that Missouri law governs the
substantive issues of property ownership, and followed the two-part test of
exclusive possession and control. 57 The court concluded that WU had been in
exclusive possession of the samples, and that this point was undisputed. 58
Further, WU owned, maintained, and funded a majority of the Biorepository. 59
The court also concluded that WU had control over the samples, too. 60 WU
controlled who had access to the samples and bore “all legal, regulatory, and
compliance risks,” and WU was responsible for complying with all federal and
state laws and regulations. 61
The court stressed that WU had continually asserted its ownership in the
samples, first in its Intellectual Property Policy (IPP) and again in its MTAs. 62
The IPP stated that tangible research property “shall be owned by [WU] if
significant [WU] resources were used.” 63 The MTAs also acknowledged WU
as the owner of samples, and WU refused Catalona’s request to assert coownership over them, 64 Catalona signed the MTAs, nonetheless. 65 Thus,
WU’s strongest claim was possession, 66 and the court concluded that WU had
exclusive possession and control over the samples. 67 Having possession and
control established, the next issue was how WU acquired the samples—were
they inter vivos gifts or bailments?
B.

Inter Vivos Gifts

The next issue discussed in WU v. Catalona was whether the samples
constituted an inter vivos gift from the RPs, and if so, to whom. 68 In Missouri,
an inter vivos gift of personal property requires three elements: 1) the donor’s
present intention to make a gift; 2) delivery of the property by the donor to the
donee; 3) acceptance by the donee. 69 Upon acceptance, the donee takes
ownership “immediately and absolutely.” 70 The donee has the burden of
proving ownership with clear and convincing evidence, which can be

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 994.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 994-95.
Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 995.
Id. at 989.
Id. at 995.
Id.
Andrews, supra note 8, at 402.
Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 997.
Id.
Duvall v. Henke, 749 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
Id.
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determined not only through specific language, but also by examining the
circumstances surrounding the action. 71
In Catalona, the court found the circumstances surrounding the donations
constituted clear and convincing evidence that the RPs made inter vivos gifts
to WU. 72 First, the court found that the informed consent forms showed the
RPs had the present intention to make a gift. 73 The forms, bearing the WU
logo, did not state that Catalona would have sole possession of the samples,
and they included language that the research would be conducted by “Catalona
and/or colleagues.” 74 Moreover, the forms used the term “donation,” and at
least some of the forms referenced a waiver of claims to the samples. 75 Thus,
present intent to make a donation was clear, and since a completed inter vivos
gift cannot be revoked, the RPs’ desires to later transfer the samples were
merely “afterthought[s] of regret.” 76 Thus, the court found the RPs had the
present intent to make a gift. 77 Second, it was undisputed that the RPs
“delivered” the property, presumably since they had possession of the samples
before surgery, and following surgery WU had possession. Lastly, the court
found that WU accepted the samples by placing them in the Biorepository and
claiming ownership. 78 Thus, the court concluded that the RPs donated their
samples as inter vivos gifts, which could not be revoked.
The RPs had a counterargument, though. First, the RPs that testified
denied making an unconditional gift, and Catalona denied receiving an
unconditional gift. 79 The RPs argued that conditions attached to the donation
that afforded the RPs additional rights in the samples. 80 Thus, the RPs argued
that even if the donations were characterized as gifts, they were conditional
gifts whose conditions would not be satisfied with WU as the owner. 81 The
RPs claimed they went to WU merely to see Catalona; as such, the gifts were
made on the condition that Catalona and his designees would use the samples,

71. Id.
72. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 997.
73. Id.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 999.
76. Id. at 999. The court showed some empathy for the RPs attempt to help Catalona
retrieve their samples, but then the court discredited their testimonies by implying a bias due to a
“deep personal connection to Dr. Catalona” because he saved their lives. Id.
77. Id. at 998. However, the court noted that the informed consent forms were
“inconsequential” because a gift does not require written documentation; federal regulations
required it here, though, because it concerned a biological material. Id. Curiously, the court’s
opinion suggested that the finding of intent was based mostly on these “inconsequential”
informed consent forms, restating no other evidence.
78. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 998.
79. Andrews, supra note 8, at 402.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 403.
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not WU. 82 With Catalona gone, WU could not meet that condition. 83 The RPs
supported their argument by noting that Catalona was an “internationally
known prostate cancer surgeon and researcher.” 84 A brief glance at Catalona’s
website confirmed his notoriety; he developed the PSA screening test for
prostate cancer. 85 It would be absurd to question his skill or accomplishments
as a surgeon and researcher. But did Catalona’s skill mean that the RPs
wanted only him to use their tissues in research, as opposed to WU? One
observer believed so, analogizing that “just because a person trusts his son to
drive his car, despite the fact that the son might get in an accident, does not
mean that the person has given up ownership of the car or that the person is
indifferent to who drives his car.” 86
C. Bailment
The RPs, however, did not believe they made inter vivos gifts to WU.
Instead, they argued the samples were bailments, not gifts, and WU was
merely a bailee. 87 A bailment is “a contract resulting from the delivery of
goods by bailor to bailee on condition that they be restored to the bailor . . .
[once] the purposes for which they were bailed are answered.” 88 In other
words, a bailment occurs when one party hands possession of personal
property to another with the expectation that it will be returned in the future. 89
A bailment can be expressed or implied. 90 The RPs have since made the
analogy (during oral arguments on appeal) to the United Parcel Service, noting
that with packages, there is a bailment relationship even though the customer
has no expectation of return. 91 If the donations were bailments, then the RPs
could retain ownership rights of the samples even after WU took possession.
The District Court rejected the RPs’ bailment argument, noting that they
had no expectation of having the samples returned, nor was any evidence

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 398.
85. Dr. Catalona – Prostate Cancer, PSA Study, and Nerve Sparing Prostate Surgery,
http://www.drcatalona.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
86. Andrews, supra note 8, at 401.
87. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 1001.
88. Seitz v. Lemay Bank & Trust Co., 959 S.W.2d 458, 461 (Mo. 1998).
89. SANDRA H. JOHNSON, PETER W. SALSICH, JR., THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MICHAEL
BRAUNSTEIN, PROPERTY LAW 30 (West Group 2d ed. 1998).
90. Id. at 31. The authors gave an example of a person tossing car keys to another. Id.
Although not expressed, a court would imply a bailment, guessing that there was a change in
possession with the expectation to have the car returned. Id.
91. Recordings of Oral Arguments, Washington Univ. v. Catalona, No. 06-2286, 06-2301
(8th Cir. Dec. 13, 2006), available at http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/tmp/062286.html (last visited
Jan. 21, 2007).
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presented to that effect 92 The court concluded the sample donations were not
bailments. 93 However, the RPs were not finished arguing for ownership or
recognition of a bailment, addressing the elephant in the room—that these
samples were not simple personal property but instead biological materials.
V. FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: IF THE RESEARCH
INVOLVES HUMAN SUBJECTS, THEN RESEARCHERS MUST OBTAIN INFORMED
CONSENT AND ALLOW THE PARTICIPANT TO HAVE THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW
FROM THE STUDY
A wide range of special considerations exist in cases involving biological
materials. These include the protection of human subjects, informed consent,
and the right to discontinue participation, each of which is subject to some
form of federal regulation. The U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) oversees the protection of human research subjects, issuing
federal regulations known informally as the “Common Rule.” 94 The Office of
Human Research Protection (OHRP) is responsible for enforcing these DHHS
regulations by investigating complaints and conducting audits. 95 The OHRP
has a duty to protect volunteers in research supported by DHHS. 96
Federal regulations are important in research. A Consensus Statement
printed in the Journal of the American Medical Association stated, “[M]uch
weight is given to federal regulations regarding the protection of human
subjects both because they are legally enforceable and because they are the
embodiment of an attempt to strike a balance between the desire to increase
knowledge and the protection of individual interests.” 97 Although the court’s
decision had an emphasis on property law, federal regulation played a role in
that decision. First, however, it must be determined that the federal regulations
apply in this case. Following that, specific federal regulations will be
92. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 1001.
93. Id. at 1001.
94. BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY S. JOST &
ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ, BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 420 n.1 (5th ed. 2004).
95. Id. at 421 n.7.
96. OHRP Fact Sheet, http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/about/ohrpfactsheet.htm (last visited Jan.
21, 2007).
97. Ellen Wright Clayton et al., Consensus Statement, Informed Consent for Genetic
Research on Stored Tissue Samples, 274 JAMA 1786, 1787 (Dec. 13, 1995). The article clarifies
the authors of the article, “A WORKSHOP consisting of scientists, ethicists, lawyers, and
consumers was convened jointly by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) on July 7 and 8, 1994, at the NIH to develop
recommendations for securing appropriate informed consent when collecting tissue samples for
possible use in genetic research and for defining indications for additional consent if samples in
hand are to be used for genetic studies. The analysis that follows represents the consensus of the
individuals listed . . . (although not all signers agreed with every point) and is not the official
policy of the NIH and the CDC.” Id. at 1786.
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examined, including those on informed consent and the right to discontinue or
withdraw from participation in research.
A.

Threshold Issue: Do Federal Regulations Apply to Catalona?

Both WU and the research itself must meet certain criteria in order for the
Common Rule, concerning research on human tissues, to apply. The
requirements for application of the Common Rule can be found directly in the
Code of Federal Regulations, which states:
[T]his policy applies to all research involving human subjects conducted,
supported or otherwise subject to regulation by any federal department or
agency which takes appropriate administrative action to make the policy
applicable to such research. 98

Relative to Catalona, two particular aspects need to be examined. First, was
WU’s research “conducted, supported or otherwise subject to regulation by any
federal department or agency” (i.e. is WU subject to federal regulation?), and
second, did the research conducted on stored prostate tissue samples involve
human subjects?
1. Is Washington University subject to the Federal regulations?
Technically, the Common Rule only applies to research either funded by
the federal government or subject to federal regulation. 99 Often, however, as a
condition of receiving any federal funding, an academic institution must agree
to apply the Common Rule to all academic research. 100 This is done using a
formal agreement called an assurance, which requires institutions (like
Washington University, for example) to comply with the Common Rule. 101
The academic institution makes the assurance to the DHHS (via the OHRP). 102
In the assurance, the institution agrees to follow DHHS regulations in all
research, even projects not federally funded or otherwise subject to federal
regulation. 103 The OHRP has the authority to take action in response to
violations of the assurance, but in Catalona, it took no action against WU. 104
Neither WU nor the RPs directly objected that the Common Rule did not apply
to WU.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2005).
FURROW ET AL., supra note 93, at 420 n.1.
Id.
OHRP Fact Sheet, supra note 95.
FURROW ET AL., supra note 93, at 420 n.1.
Id.
Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 992.
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2. Does research on stored human tissue involve “human subjects?” If
so, does severing the informational link between a sample and Its
donor change the result?
In order for research to be subject to federal regulation, it must involve
“human subjects.” 105 It would be difficult to deny that the RPs were not
human subjects at the time the tissue was removed and donated, especially
after hearing their testimony in this case. However, an indirect, unstated
argument laid beneath the surface. In testimony at trial, WU stated that one
option it had concerning the previously-donated tissue samples was to
“anonymize” them. 106 In anonymizing a sample, all identifying information
linking the donor to the sample is destroyed. 107 The argument is that once
identifying information was removed, the sample no longer involved a human
subject because it could not be traced back to any particular person. 108
This indirect argument that anonymizing a sample would exclude it from
the Common Rule 109 has some basis in the Code of Federal Regulations:
(b) Unless otherwise required by department or agency heads, research
activities in which the only involvement of human subjects will be in one or
more of the following categories are exempt from this policy:
....
(4) Research, involving the collection or study of existing data, documents,
records, pathological specimens, or diagnostic specimens, if these sources
are publicly available or if the information is recorded by the investigator
in such a manner that subjects cannot be identified, directly or through
identifiers linked to the subjects. 110

Thus, two criteria exist for the use of anonymous samples. 111 First, the
samples must already exist at the beginning of the research; second, identifiers
linking the subjects to their samples must be removed. 112 If both elements are
met, then a human subject is no longer involved. 113 The effect is that the
Common Rule would not apply, and informed consent would not be
required. 114 The National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC), created
105.
106.
107.
108.

45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2006).
Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 992.
Id. at 992, n.10.
NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION 15 (1999).
109. See Andrews, supra note 8, at 398 n.1.
110. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (2006) (emphasis added).
111. Clayton et al., supra note 96, at 1787.
112. Id.
113. NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 107, at 15.
114. Id.
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by former President Bill Clinton, 115 seemed to agree, stating that as long as
those two requirements are met, the Common Rule permits researchers to take
and use samples, even without a subject’s consent. 116
It is not clear how complete the severance must be, though. Some claim
that it must be “impossible under any circumstances to identify the individual
source” of the sample, and that even the institution must not have the ability to
do so. 117 However, this may be an extreme view. New guidance from the
OHRP suggested that when the sample has been coded and the researcher does
not have access to the key, then it would no longer involve a human subject. 118
The OHRP’s guidance on the subject stated:
OHRP does not consider research involving only coded private information or
specimens to involve human subjects as defined under 45 CFR 46.102(f) if the
following conditions are both met:
(1) the private information or specimens were not collected specifically for the
currently proposed research project through an interaction or intervention with
living individuals; and

115. Exec. Order No. 12,975, 60 Fed. Reg. 52,063 (Oct. 3, 1995). The NBAC’s functions
included:
(a) NBAC shall provide advice and make recommendations to the National Science and
Technology Council and to other appropriate government entities regarding the following
matters: (1) the appropriateness of departmental, agency, or other governmental programs,
policies, assignments, missions, guidelines, and regulations as they relate to bioethical
issues arising from research on human biology and behavior; and (2) applications,
including the clinical applications, of that research. (b) NBAC shall identify broad
principles to govern the ethical conduct of research, citing specific projects only as
illustrations for such principles. (c) NBAC shall not be responsible for the review and
approval of specific projects. (d) In addition to responding to requests for advice and
recommendations from the National Science and Technology Council, NBAC also may
accept suggestions of issues for consideration from both the Congress and the public.
NBAC also may identify other bioethical issues for the purpose of providing advice and
recommendations, subject to the approval of the National Science and Technology
Council.
60 Fed. Reg. at 52,063-64.
Incidentally, the current NBAC was created in 2001 by President George W. Bush as the
President’s Council on Bioethics, advising him on bioethical issues that emerge “as a
consequence of advances in biomedical science and technology.” Exec. Order No. 13,237, 66
Fed. Reg. 59,851 (Nov. 28, 2001). The Council does not oversee regulations for government
agencies; its purpose is solely to advise the President. Id. The NBAC was renewed through
September 29, 2007 by Exec. Order No. 13385, Fed. Reg. 57989 (Sept. 29, 2005).
116. National Bioethics Advisory Commission, supra note 107, at 16.
117. Clayton et al., supra note 96, at 1787.
118. Ellen Wright Clayton, Informed Consent and Biobanks, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 15, 16
(2005).
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(2) the investigator(s) cannot readily ascertain the identity of the individual(s)
to whom the coded private information or specimens pertain because, for
example:
(a) the key to decipher the code is destroyed before the research begins;
(b) the investigators and the holder of the key enter into an agreement
prohibiting the release of the key to the investigators under any
circumstances, until the individuals are deceased (note that the HHS
regulations do not require the IRB to review and approve this agreement);
(c) there are IRB-approved written policies and operating procedures for a
repository or data management center that prohibit the release of the key to
the investigators under any circumstances, until the individuals are
deceased; or
(d) there are other legal requirements prohibiting the release of the key to
the investigators, until the individuals are deceased.
This guidance applies to existing private information and specimens, as well as
to private information and specimens to be collected in the future for purposes
other than the currently proposed research. The following are examples of
private information or specimens that will be collected in the future for
purposes other than the currently proposed research: (1) medical records; and
(2) ongoing collection of specimens for a tissue repository. 119

The OHRP guidance also states that when analyzing whether the research
involves a human subject, one must focus on what the researcher is
obtaining. 120 “If the [researchers] are not obtaining . . . data through
intervention or interaction with living individuals . . . then the research activity
does not involve human subjects.” 121 In interpreting the above OHRP’s
guidance, Ellen Wright Clayton affirmed that the Common Rule does not
apply to “investigators who receive only coded information so long as they do
not have access to the key” because the research would not involve human
subjects. 122
Whether the samples in Catalona would be excluded as research on human
subjects based on the OHRP’s guidance remains unclear. At least some
samples were not collected specifically for the current research, but rather for
the Biorepository. If the identifying information were severed from the
sample, an argument could be made that the research no longer involved
human subjects.
119. Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), Guidance on Research Involving
Coded Private Information or Biological Specimens, available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/
humansubjects/guidance/cdebiol.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2007) (emphasis in original).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Clayton, supra note 117, at 16.
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Even if the research did not involve human subjects, some argue that it
would be ethically wrong to acquire and anonymize samples without consent
because researchers would have had the opportunity to get consent; they just
failed to do so. 123 Further, Lori Andrews, a professor of law and Director of
the Institute for Science, Law and Technology, 124 stated that some of the RPs
objected to anonymization because they claimed that severing the samples
from identifying information would “reduce the value of their contributions by
limiting the type of prostate cancer research that could be done and because it
would prevent the patients from learning specific details of what the research
had shown in their own tissue.” 125 Andrews later argued that patients agreed
to participate in Catalona’s research with the hope of benefiting “future
generations of cancer sufferers . . . including family members unlucky enough
to inherit the genetic risk of developing the disease.” 126
A conclusion on this point has not been reached. 127 Nonetheless, regarding
the Biorepository, WU might be permitted to anonymize the samples without
consent of the donors, but that argument is closely tied into the basic argument
in Catalona—that WU has control over the samples.
3. If a participant dies, does the research still involve a human subject?
There is one last issue to address stemming from the human subject
requirement of the Common Rule. 128 The Common Rule’s definition of a
human subject begins with “a living individual . . . .” 129 A Consensus
Statement in the Journal of the American Medical Association might shed light
on the subject; although the Consensus Statement concerned genetic research,
it could be applied to other forms of research. 130 The authors of the Consensus
Statement noted that any use of samples from deceased patients is not covered
by the federal regulations. 131 The authors were also quick to point out that
with genetic research, information could be revealed that “may pose
psychosocial risks to living relative,” but “[t]he absence of risks to living
people may justify the use for genetic research of anonymous samples.” 132

123. Clayton et al., supra note 96, at 1788.
124. Andrews, supra note 8, at 398 n.2. Andrews’ career has “focused almost exclusively on
genetic rights and tissue issues. She has written 10 books and more than 100 articles and legal
briefs; she has advised Congress, the World Health Organization, the National Institutes of Health
and 14 foreign countries.” Skloot, supra note 9, at § 6.
125. Andrews, supra note 8, at 399.
126. Id. at 403.
127. Clayton et al., supra note 96, at 1788.
128. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2005).
129. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f) (2005).
130. Clayton et al., supra note 96.
131. Id. at 1790.
132. Id.
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The article did not further clarify, but presumably the psychosocial risks would
involve the fact that donors would not want any genetic disease publicized. In
Catalona, the research was not genetic in nature. However, similar
psychosocial risks could arise as long as the samples remain linked to a
specific donor. Although the Common Rule, on its face, seems to exclude
samples from deceased donors, the issue has not been decided. 133 It is
plausible that a court would treat the disposition of tissues no differently than
those from living subjects: destroy them, store them indefinitely, or anonymize
them.
B.

Two Particular Provisions of the Common Rule: Informed Consent and
the Right to Withdraw From Participation

Since federal regulations (including the Common Rule) apply, two
provisions of particular importance are present in Catalona: informed consent
and the right to discontinue participation. 134
1. Informed consent. Is it necessary? Are there flaws? Is exculpatory
language permitted, relieving the researcher from liability?
a. Informed consent is necessary
The Common Rule provides a basis for the requirements of informed
consent, indirectly providing a definition, stating:
[N]o investigator may involve a human being as a subject in research covered
by this policy unless the investigator has obtained the legally effective
informed consent of the subject or the subject’s legally authorized
representative. An investigator shall seek such consent only under
circumstances that provide the prospective subject or the representative
sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not to participate and that
minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influence. The information that
is given to the subject or the representative shall be in language understandable
to the subject or the representative. 135

Thus, prior to conducting research on human subjects, a researcher must
provide potential subjects with information about the risks and benefits that
accompany it. 136 Potential subjects can then make an informed decision
whether to expose themselves to any health and safety risks, in the name of
research. 137 Informed consent had its legal origin in cases involving serious
physical injury or death; if potential participants fully knew of the risks, they

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 990 (referring to 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2005)).
45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2005) (emphasis added).
Clayton et al., supra note 96, at 1787.
Id.
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may have shied away from participating in the study. 138 In Catalona, there
was no question that informed consent forms were signed by the donors. 139
b. Informed consent has its flaws
There are concerns with the doctrine of informed consent, however. When
there are no physical risks, the scope of informed consent is in question. 140
One court analyzed this by splitting research into two categories:
nontherapeutic and therapeutic. 141 The court, in defining the categories, stated:
At least to the extent that commercial profit motives are not implicated,
therapeutic research’s purpose is to directly help or aid a patient who is
suffering from a health condition the objectives of the research are designed to
address—hopefully by the alleviation, or potential alleviation, of the health
condition. Nontherapeutic research generally utilizes subjects who are not
known to have the condition the objectives of the research are designed to
address, and/or is not designed to directly benefit the subjects utilized in the
research, but, rather, is designed to achieve beneficial results for the public at
large. 142

With regard to nontherapeutic research, informed consent is necessary. 143 By
contrast, however, much of the risk is eliminated with therapeutic research
because the primary purpose is to benefit the patient. 144 Further, in research
involving tissue samples obtained from surgeries, nearly all of the risk is
eliminated because the patients needed the surgeries anyway. 145 Requiring
informed consent in cases with little or no physical risk might seem pointless,
notwithstanding other types of risk. 146 In fact, the NBAC stated, “[W]hen
important research poses little or no risk to subjects whose consent would be
difficult or impossible to obtain, it is appropriate to waive the consent
requirement.” 147 Research that poses little or no risk to subjects is rare, if it
exists at all, but research on stored tissue might come close. In Catalona, the
excision of a donor’s cancerous tissue could be seen as therapeutic, and the
resulting tissue sample as merely a by-product. Health risks, with respect to
138. Clayton, supra note 117, at 18.
139. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 997.
140. There are other types of risks in research, such as psychological, social, economic, and
legal. For further discussion on these, see CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND
REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 245 (2005).
141. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 811-12 n.2 (Md. 2001).
142. Id. at 811.
143. See Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 F. Supp. 1463, 1472 (M.D.N.C. 1986), aff’d, 829 F.2d
1340 (4th Cir. 1987) (where the court held that for nontherapeutic research, there is a duty to
inform the participant of all risks that are reasonably foreseeable).
144. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 811 n.2.
145. Clayton et al., supra note 96, at 1788.
146. See COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 139.
147. NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 107, at 66.
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the research, would be eliminated as the patients’ cancerous excisions would
have occurred anyway.
Informed consent has also been questioned when obtaining consent is
impracticable. 148 A Consensus Statement in the Journal of the American
Medical Association, concerning informed consent for stored tissue samples,
noted that there has been little litigation concerning informed consent and
impracticability in research. 149 The statement stressed, though, “[C]onsent
cannot be waived on the simple assertion that seeking it would be tedious,
burdensome or costly.” 150 Instead, a balancing test was suggested where the
burden and cost of obtaining consent would be weighed against the possibility
that the research might not go forward. 151
Even when informed consent is required, concern exists that the consent
forms may be inadequate. 152 Donors are usually not informed that their
samples can be retained and used for other studies. 153 In fact, the samples may
be used in research for unrelated purposes at other institutions. 154 Some argue
that an informed consent form should specify whether it includes permission to
store (and later use) tissue in a biobank. 155 Not only would the form enable an
individual to decide whether to accept certain risks, but it would also “honor”
the contribution the donor is making. 156 However, others argue there is some
question as to whether a donor should be allowed to give such “blanket consent
for future research,” given that it may be impossible to make an informed
choice. 157
c. The prohibition of exculpatory language in an informed consent form
The RPs argued one additional caveat of the Common Rule. They
challenged the validity of the informed consent forms in Catalona because
they contained exculpatory language prohibited by the Common Rule. 158 The
Common Rule states:
No informed consent, whether oral or written, may include any exculpatory
language through which the subject or the representative is made to waive or
appear to waive any of the subject’s legal rights, or releases or appears to

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Clayton et al., supra note 96, at 1789.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1787.
Id. at 1787.
Clayton et al., supra note 96, at 1787.
Clayton, supra note 117, at 19.
Id.
Id. at 19-20.
Washington Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 998 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
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release the investigator, the sponsor, the institution or its agents from liability
for negligence. 159

The court, however, concluded that prohibition of exculpatory language
applied only to waivers of legal rights due to negligence, not to the property
issue in Catalona. 160 Curiously, though, the OHRP listed guidance on its
website which provides examples of exculpatory language. 161 Two improper
examples are:
1. I voluntarily and freely donate any and all blood, urine, and tissue samples
to the U.S. Government and hereby relinquish all right, title, and interest to
said items.
2. By consent to participate in this research, I give up any property rights I may
have in bodily fluids or tissue samples obtained in the course of the
research. 162

These two examples, the second in particular, seems to refute the court’s
conclusion that the prohibition on exculpatory language does not apply to
property rights. The discrepancy has not been resolved, and researchers are
still left with the question as to whether informed consent forms can affect
property rights. Another Common Rule provision remains to be examined,
however: the right to discontinue participation. 163
2. Right to discontinue participation—what happens to prior donated
samples?
The Common Rule states that one of the requirements of informed consent
is to provide each subject with information including a statement that
“participation is voluntary, refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss
of benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled, and the subject may
discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefit,” and it
also states that the RPs must be provided with information concerning “[t]he
consequences of a subject’s decision to withdraw from the research and
procedures for orderly termination of participation by the subject.” 164 In
Catalona, the informed consent forms also provided for withdrawal from
research, stating that an RP “may choose not to participate in this research
study or withdraw your consent at any time.” 165
159. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2005) (emphasis added).
160. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 998.
161. Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), “Exculpatory Language” in Informed
Consent, http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/exculp.htm (last visited Feb. 7,
2007).
162. Id. (emphasis added).
163. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 998.
164. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(8) (1991); 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(4) (1991).
165. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 990.
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However, as the Catalona court correctly noted: “The federal regulations
do not address the matter of a RP’s ‘right’ to physically possess their samples
upon termination of their participation in a research study; or, a ‘right’ to direct
their sample[s] transfer to another institution or Principal Investigator.” 166
Indeed, the informed consent forms, too, are silent on the issue of whether RPs
can withdraw their previously-donated samples or transfer them to another
facility. 167
Catalona and the RPs argued that the right to withdraw from participation
found in the Common Rule included the right to withdraw prior donated
samples. 168 The RPs, in essence, were arguing that if property ownership was
viewed as a bundle of sticks, then they would still hold at least one (the right to
withdraw); therefore, WU would not have complete property rights over the
samples. The court disagreed and concluded that the right to withdraw meant
only that the RP could decide not to provide any more samples; it did not affect
prior samples. 169 On appeal in the Eighth Circuit, during oral arguments, WU
responded to the RPs’ argument by distinguishing the right to withdraw as a
privacy right, not a property right. 170 The Common Rule would allow WU to
either destroy the samples or anonymize them. 171 Anonymizing the samples
would protect the donor’s privacy, not a property right. Therefore, WU argued
destruction of the samples must have the same purpose. 172 Thus, the Eighth
Circuit now has an additional argument to consider, but given that the district
court found for WU, the conclusion should not change—the right to withdraw
does not include the right to retrieve prior samples.
VI. LEGAL PRECEDENT INVOLVING TISSUES IN RESEARCH—SCARCE, ONLY
TWO SIMILAR YET DISTINGUISHABLE CASES
Only two relevant cases exist concerning the donation of biological
materials for research purposes. According to Catalona, there was a “scarcity
of legal precedent to assist” in situations involving ownership of biological
materials donated for research, and there were only two cases: Moore v.
Regents of the University of California and Greenberg v. Miami Children’s

166. Id. at 992.
167. Id. at 990.
168. Id. at 999.
169. Id.
170. Recording of Oral Argument, Washington Univ. v. Catalona No. 06-2286, No. 06-2301
(8th Cir. Dec. 13, 2006), http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/tmp/062286.html (last visited Jan. 21,
2007).
171. Id.
172. Id.
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Hospital Research Institute, Inc. 173 With a dearth of cases concerning the
issue, these two opinions must be carefully examined to ensure consistency
with federal regulations, as the Catalona court did here. 174 In short, both cases
found the RPs to be donors who lost all ownership rights in their samples once
donated. 175 Likewise, the Catalona court was persuaded to apply the same
reasoning, although the cases were easily distinguishable. 176
A.

Moore v. Regents of the University of California

In Moore, 177 the court had to determine whether the plaintiff, Moore,
stated a cause of action of conversion against Golde (the physician), Quan (a
university researcher), regents (owners and operators of the university) and
others. 178 Moore, diagnosed with the rare disease hairy cell leukemia, 179 went
to Golde for treatment. 180 Golde told Moore “that he had reason to fear for his
life,” and he proposed a splenectomy. 181 Golde and Quan decided to take the
excised spleen and use it for research purposes, without informing Moore. 182
Further, Golde asked Moore to return to the medical center several times over
the next seven years to give samples of blood, blood serum, skin, bone marrow
aspirate, and sperm, under the guise that it was necessary for his health. 183
During this time, the samples were actually needed so that Golde could
continue his research and exploit the cells. 184 Golde and Quan subsequently
obtained a patent for a cell line created from Moore’s samples. 185
The opinion addressed two issues: 1) fiduciary duty and informed consent,
and 2) conversion. 186 In the former, the court examined whether the physician
had a duty to acquire the patient’s informed consent and whether the physician
173. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 995 (referencing Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) and Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F.
Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003)).
174. See id. at 995-97.
175. Id. at 997.
176. Id.
177. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). For an in-depth
overview of the case, see Skloot, supra note 9, at § 6.
178. Moore, 793 P.2d at 480-81.
179. The disease is called “hairy” cell leukemia because when examined under a microscope,
the cells look hairy. National Cancer Institute, General Information About Hairy Cell Leukemia,
http://www.cancer.gov/cancerinfo/pdq/treatment/hairy-cell-leukemia/patient/ (last visited Nov.
14, 2006).
180. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 482.
186. Moore, 793 P.2d at 483, 487. Conversion is “a tort that protects against interference
with possessory and ownership interests in personal property.” Id. at 487.
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had a duty to disclose his research intentions and his economic interests prior
to conducting the medical procedures. 187 In the second issue, the court
examined the patient’s conversion claim, where the patient argued that he
continued to own his samples following removal, and that he never consented
to their use. 188
1. Fiduciary duty and informed consent
The patient, Moore, alleged that Golde failed to disclose his research and
economic interests before obtaining consent to use the samples. 189 A physician
has a duty to disclose personal interests that may bias professional judgment,
and a failure to do so results in a cause of action for performing medical
procedures without informed consent. 190 Golde argued that the scientific use
of cells already removed cannot affect the health of a patient. 191 However, the
court stated that a physician with a research interest may, perhaps
subconsciously, recommend a procedure that might not be in the patient’s best
interest. 192 The court held that a physician must, when obtaining informed
consent, disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient’s health. 193
2. Conversion
In his claim for conversion, the patient argued that he continued to own his
samples following removal, and that he never consented to their use. 194 The
patient further claimed that as a result of the conversion, he had a proprietary
interest in each product ever created from his cells. 195 The court noted,
however, that if the patient won the conversion argument, a duty would be
imposed on researchers to investigate every human sample ever used in their
research. 196 Further, since Moore did not expect to retain possession of his
cells after removal, then in order to sue for conversion, he must have retained
some other ownership interest in them. 197 However, the California Health and
Safety Code dictated the disposition of human biological materials based on
policy goals, not the law of personal property. 198 The policy goals were to
ensure safe handling of hazardous waste materials, not to compensate donors;

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 483.
Id. at 487.
Id. at 483.
Id.
Id. at 484.
Moore, 793 P.2d at 484.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 487.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 488-89.
Moore, 793 P.2d at 489.
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once the policy goal is recognized, the practical effect is that what is left does
not constitute a property interest for the purposes of conversion. 199 The Moore
court concluded its conversion analysis by stating that the cell line cannot be
the patient’s property because it is “both factually and legally distinct” from
his donated cells. 200
3. Application of Moore v. Regents to Washington University v. Catalona
Moore can be distinguished from Catalona in several important respects.
First, in Moore the facts involved a cell line created from donations, whereas
Catalona involved the donations themselves. Next, unlike Moore where the
physician did not disclose his research interests, in Catalona there was no
question whether the RPs knew what would become of their tissue (although it
may be cloudy as to whether they thought their tissues could still be used after
they exercised their rights to withdraw). Further, although the Moore court
stated that a physician might subconsciously recommend a procedure not in the
patient’s best interest, factual distinctions also exist between Moore and
Catalona. In Moore, many of the procedures performed by Golde had no
purpose other than research. In Catalona, however, there was no question that
the RPs needed the surgeries for cancer treatment. Moreover, in Moore the
physician and RPs were on opposing sides, whereas here Catalona and the RPs
want the same thing.
Further, with respect to the conversion argument, similarities exist between
Moore and Catalona. In Moore, the court noted that the patient did not expect
to retain possession of the cells, just like the RPs in Catalona. Further, in
Moore the court followed the California Health and Safety Code to determine
the disposition of the samples, not general property law. Although the
Catalona court followed similar federal and state (Missouri) health and safety
codes, it placed more emphasis on the role of general property laws. In the
end, the Catalona court took from Moore that a research participant/donor did
not retain any ownership rights in the samples after the donation of the
biological materials. 201
B.

Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc.

In Greenberg, 202 donors of human biological materials sued
physician/researcher Dr. Matalon (Matalon), who used the donated samples to
isolate a gene which he then attempted to patent. 203 The donors claimed the

199. Id. at 491-92.
200. Id. at 492.
201. Washington Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 997 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
202. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D.
Fla. 2003).
203. Id. at 1067.
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purpose of their donations was to further research of Canavan disease, hoping
to lead to prenatal testing for the disease as well as carrier detection which
would benefit the public at large. 204 The donors’ intent was not for the
samples to be used for profit-motives that limit research. 205 Matalon
successfully isolated the gene and, unbeknownst to the donors, filed a patent
application for his discovery. 206 Once granted, Matalon (and other defendants)
had the power to restrict any research related to that gene by any other
researchers. 207 In fact, Matalon exercised that right with threats, and then
allowed access to the gene only through licensing agreements which charged
royalty fees. 208
The donors filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, lack of informed consent
and conversion. 209 The plaintiffs’ argument for lack of informed consent
revolved around the defendants’ failure to disclose the intent to patent and
profit off the donations. 210 The court disagreed and refused to extend informed
consent in that manner. 211
The plaintiffs’ argument for conversion centered on their claim that the
defendants deprived them of a property interest in their body tissue. 212 The
court disagreed, stating, “These were donations to research without any
contemporaneous expectations of return of the body tissues and genetic
samples, and thus conversion does not lie as a cause of action.” 213 The court
recognized that for a conversion claim, the plaintiffs must have had a property
interest, which they lacked. 214 Further, the property right in biological tissue
samples “evaporates once the sample is voluntarily given to a third party.” 215
Thus, the court concluded that the donors had no claim for conversion. 216
Ann important factual distinction arises between Greenberg and Catalona.
In Greenberg, the court recognized that the “patented result of research is ‘both

204. Id. at 1066-67.
205. Id. at 1067. The defendants threatened other facilities that attempted to use the patented
technology, and they also restricted public accessibility through licensing agreements and
royalties. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1067.
209. Id. at 1068. The plaintiffs also alleged breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment,
fraudulent concealment, and misappropriation of trade secrets. Id. Presumably, the district court
in Washington Univ. v. Catalona did not discuss these since those have no direct application to
the case at bar.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1071.
212. Id. at 1074.
213. Id.
214. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1074.
215. Id. at 1075.
216. Id. at 1076.
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factually and legally distinct’ from excised material used in the research.” 217
In Catalona, however, the tissues were not altered—only stored—with no
evidence of commercial intent 218 which, may limit the applicability of
Greenberg. Nonetheless, in Catalona, the court followed the advice of
Greenberg, asserting that the RPs were donors who voluntarily gave up
ownership rights in their biological materials upon donation. 219
VII. PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS—THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE PATIENT’S
RIGHT TO MAKE AN INFORMED DECISION AND THE RIGHT TO PROTECT
RESEARCH THAT FURTHERS SCIENCE AND SOCIETY
In Moore, the court analyzed the policy issues concerning donations of
biological materials as a battle between two considerations. 220 The first issue
is the protection of the RP’s right to make autonomous medical decisions. 221
Second, research must be protected; innocent researchers merely engaging in
socially useful activities should not be threatened with “disabling civil
liability” when they have no reason to believe their use of a sample is against
the donor’s wishes. 222 The Moore court stated that these two policy
considerations must be balanced, but noted that it may be more important to
remove uncertainty rather than necessarily finding the best balance. 223 The
two policy considerations must be examined.
A.

The Research Participant’s Right to Make an Informed Medical Decision

Individuals have the right to make informed decisions about their health.
The Common Rule’s informed consent provision states as much. 224 It is
doubtful that anyone would object to the idea that a person has a right to
dictate what happens to their body, and that right is more important than
conducting research. The Consensus Statement warned, “[D]espite the
desirability of increased knowledge, research [must not] risk harming the
individuals who are being studied.” 225 Logically, then, as the Moore court
stated, a remedy should exist “when physicians act with undisclosed motives
that may affect their professional judgment.” 226
However, the issue is clouded when instead of research on a person’s own
body, the research concerns a tissue sample that has already been excised and
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 1074-75 (citing Moore, 793 P.2d at 492).
Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 989.
Id. at 997.
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 494 (Cal. 1990).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2005).
Clayton et al., supra note 96, at 1787.
Moore, 793 P.2d at 493.
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stored. For samples that were taken with a specific research purpose in mind,
consent would be easy to obtain from the donor for that specific project. With
stored tissue banks, although the donor was initially told about the purposes of
the donation, as time passes, circumstances change. A different research
project might need samples. Where else would a researcher look but to a
biobank? Researchers may not be intentionally disobeying the donors’ wishes,
and they generally want to gather as much information as possible to advance
research. 227 However, in all the excitement, sometimes researchers do not
think about the consequences. 228 When researchers’ activities do not
correspond with the donors’ expectations, the trust between researcher and
donor is eroded. As Clayton put it:
More attention also needs to be paid to restoring the public trust in
research. A greater commitment to seeking informed consent is one way, but
so is a more far reaching and transparent discussion of the goals and benefits of
research. Part of the distrust also results from public perception that someone
else is making money out of something that is ‘theirs.’ 229

Of course, some might argue that the tissue no longer belongs to the donor. It
is clear, however, that the RPs have a right be informed of their rights prior to
donating a sample.
B.

Protecting Research: The Researcher’s Right to Perform Important
Medical Research

Undoubtedly, medical research is a good thing. As the Consensus
Statement argued, “Increasing the fund of knowledge generally is . . . good
both for society and for the individuals whose care is improved by more
complete understanding. Society rightly values research and the contributions
of those who participate as subjects in research.” 230 Thus, a researcher should
have the right to perform such research, but some important caveats must
simultaneously be recognized.
First, researchers must be allowed to use stored biological materials for
medical research. A report from the NBAC noted, “Biomedical research
routinely relies on the availability of stored human biological materials as well
as the willingness of individuals to participate in research protocols by
donating blood, tissue, or DNA samples to research.” 231 Further, stored tissue
is invaluable in cancer research:
[T]he availability of large archives of carefully documented and clinically
correlated specimens has permitted researchers to apply directly new detection
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Skloot, supra note 9, at § 6.
Id.
Clayton, supra note 117, at 19.
Clayton et al., supra note 96, at 1787.
NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 107, at 19.
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technologies to existing biological materials. This is a far more rapid and less
expensive approach than initiating new prospective studies for each new
promising candidate gene for many of the varieties of human cancer.
Conducting such studies not only would be extraordinarily costly in terms of
dollars and human effort, but would require study periods of many years, or
even decades. 232

Thus, there is a need for stored tissue samples.
Second, unrestricted access to tissues is important. 233 Some examples of
restrictions include clauses such as, “you can use my tissues for this research,
not that research,” or “don’t commercialize them, or do, and give me a cut.” 234
As of now, researchers generally have the access they want, but they fear that
restrictions might slow research. 235 “Many scientists depend on access to
tissues without the burden of restrictions that donors might make.” 236 Of
particular concern are financial restrictions by the donor, because they could
threaten the sharing of tissue for research purposes by withholding access for
money. 237 Researchers worry that it could destroy their financial incentive to
do research because donors would hold out for a large cut. 238 Nonetheless, “a
growing number of activists — ethicists, lawyers, doctors and patients — are
arguing cases and pushing for federal regulations that would change the status
quo by granting people rights to control their tissues.” 239
The practical implications of granting donors more rights must be
considered. At the time of a donation to a stored tissue bank, the research use
of that tissue is unlikely to be known. Later, when the tissue is allocated for a
particular research project, it would not be practical to disclose every research
detail or every possibility of economic benefit to a potential donor—even if
that donor could be found. The court in Greenberg noted that it would be
“unworkable and would chill medical research as it would mandate that
researchers constantly evaluate whether a disclosable event has occurred.” 240
Similarly, when Moore was decided, lawyers worried that a victory for donors
would “create chaos for researchers” and “[sound] the death knell to the
university physician-scientist.” 241 Moreover, granting donors additional rights
would give rise to a type of “dead-hand control that research subjects could

232. Id.
233. Skloot, supra note 9, at § 6.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Skloot, supra note 9, at § 6.
240. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1070
(S.D. Fla. 2003).
241. Skloot, supra note 9, at § 6.
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hold because they would be able to dictate how medical research
progresses.” 242
An additional concern is that perhaps the rights of donors have been
overstated. As Skloot stated, “Scientists aren’t stealing your arm or some vital
organ. They’re just using tissue scraps you parted with voluntarily.” 243
Further, in Greenberg, the court stated that “these Plaintiffs are more
accurately portrayed as donors rather than objects of human experimentation,
and thus the voluntary nature of their submissions warrants different
treatment.” 244
In Catalona, the court had the last say involving policy concerns. The
court noted:
The safety and welfare of human subject participants is protected through a
variety of legal and professional standards administered by committees of
persons schooled in the fields most privy to the needs of the medical/science
community. Medical research can only advance if access to these materials to
the scientific community is not thwarted by private agendas. If left unregulated
and to the whims of a RP, these highly-prized biological materials would
become nothing more than chattel going to the highest bidder. It would no
longer be a question of the importance of the research protocol to public
health, but rather who can pay the most. Selling excised tissue or DNA on EBay would become as commonplace as selling your old television on E-Bay.
The integrity and utility of all biorepositories would be seriously threatened if
RPs could move their samples from institution to institution any time they
wanted. No longer could research protocols rely on aggregate collections since
individual samples would come and go. Accountability would no longer exist
since institutions would merely be warehouses filling purchase orders.
More alarming is the great potential for prejudicial influences into medical
research. Allowing an RP to choose who can have the sample, where the
sample will be stored, and/or how the sample can be used is tantamount to a
blood donor being able to dictate that his/her blood can only be transfused into
a person of a certain ethnic background, or a donated kidney being
transplanted only into a woman or man. This kind of “selectiveness” is
repugnant to any ethical code which promotes medical research to help all of
mankind. 245

Thus, the district court was concerned about private agendas—some
financial—as well as the availability of samples in a stored tissue bank that
could be relied on. In essence, the court was concerned that research could
come to a screeching halt.

242.
243.
244.
245.

Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
Skloot, supra note 9, at § 6.
Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
Washington Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 1002 (E.D. Mo. 2006).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

WHO OWNS MY DONATED TISSUE?

385

VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In sum, in Catalona, RPs who donated prostate tissue excised during
cancer surgery at Washington University attempted to transfer that tissue to
Northwestern University. 246 The case revolves around ownership of these
samples. The district court had no choice but to treat the tissue samples as
personal property, with little discretion. The district court’s decision in
Catalona has been appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit. 247 The Eighth Circuit should surprise no one when it affirms. In fact,
the opinion could be all of one sentence, 248 stating, “We find WU to be the
owner of these samples, as it had exclusive possession and control following
the RPs voluntarily donations of the tissue samples.”
WU unquestionably had exclusive possession and control over the
samples, and the RPs could not meet their burden of showing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that they were the rightful owners. The RPs’
best response—that the donations were merely bailments—borders on the
absurd. A bailment, by definition, requires an expectation of return. 249 Any
analogy to a delivery service like UPS, Federal Express, or DHL is worthless
because in those instances, the customer expects the package to be delivered
somewhere. Also, the last time someone shipped a package via UPS, did they
“donate” it? Of course not. Here, the RPs had no expectation that the samples
were to be delivered or returned anywhere. Logic and reason support that
conclusion—the RPs wanted to give away their tissue, with no further rights or
obligations, in the hopes that someone would benefit. They knew, or should
have known, that WU would become the new owner of the samples; the
informed consent forms had the WU logo and used the term “donation.”
Although federal regulations on biologic materials complicate these issues,
the result will be unchanged. The most important purpose of informed consent
is to protect the donor’s health and safety. Here the health and safety concern
is a minimal issue because the tissues were excised in a necessary surgical
procedure for prostate cancer, and there are no significant non-physical risks
(undoubtedly making this discussion quite narrow in scope). The RPs would
have the surgeries regardless of whether the resulting tissue was donated for
research or simply destroyed. Further, their “right to withdraw” should be read
logically; it means that a donor has the right to stop donating more tissue at any
246. Id. at 994.
247. The case numbers are No. 06-2286 and No. 06-2301.
248. Of course, by convention the opinion will undoubtedly be much longer. At least with
law review articles, there is hope. See, e.g., Erik M. Jensen, The Shortest Article in Law Review
History, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 156 (2000); Grant H. Morris, The Shortest Article in Law Review
History: A Brief Response to Professor Jensen, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 310 (2000); Thomas H.
Odom, A Response to Professors Jensen and Morris, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311 (2000); Erik M.
Jensen, Comments in Reply, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 312 (2000).
249. Seitz, 959 S.W.2d at 461.
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time, without regard to prior donations. Informed consent is a mechanism to
protect the donor’s health and safety, nothing more.
Moreover, the RPs are not really a party in interest; Catalona is using his
patients to get access to tissues that he wants. Do the patients really care who
uses the samples? Maybe a little, but it is probably not as much as their
lawyers want people to think. The RPs want to eradicate prostate cancer so
that those who come after them can avoid what they had to go through.
Regardless of who owns the tissue samples, no one suggested that they would
not eventually be used for research on prostate cancer. That use seems to fall
in line with the RPs’ wishes.
So, what is this case about, really? It is about money, or at least the future
ability to earn it. True, no one argued that the RPs or Catalona had any
financial motive for the lawsuit. But there are financial incentives to perform
research. Successful research equals money, not only from private companies
but also to obtain grants from the federal government. Further, it is not the
RPs who truly want money; when they made their donations, they thought the
tissues were valueless. They were right, of course; the tissues were valueless,
and they will continue to be valueless until researchers find a way to utilize
them. Sure, the donors might be tempted by greed once they see that their
tissues were turned into a valuable product, but this is no different than selling
paint to Picasso—it was worthless until he converted it into a masterpiece.
Also, public policy dictates that the RPs should not be allowed to sell their
tissue to the highest bidder. If they were allowed to do so, researchers could
no longer count on the availability of samples collected. Further, the
administrative hardship that it would create would be a disincentive to
maintain biobanks for medical research, which is the opposite of the societal
goal of medical research.
However, even a reversal would probably not rattle the research world as
some suggest, leading back to the original question: Will this case “shape the
evolving law of research on body tissue?” 250 It will not. The holding in this
case is not what makes it important; it will be easily distinguished, much like
Moore and Greenberg were.
What makes the case so important is that it creates discussion about serious
issues involving research in the 21st Century. Would the RPs have had a
problem with the disposition of their samples if they knew ahead of time that
WU would own them free and clear? Doubtful. The importance of this case is
to teach researchers and institutions about the consequences of communication
failures in respect to ownership of research samples. In theory, the rightful
owner of the tissue samples should be the one who will best use them. This is
not a question that a court can decide; it is a question best left to experts, like
WU and Northwestern University. The universities could have collaborated to
250. See Andrews, supra note 8, at 399-400.
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come up with mankind’s best solution in a mutually profitable way. Instead, a
lawsuit seemed more appropriate to them. Now, the RPs’ outcry in this case
has swelled more than their prostates ever did.
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